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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious global connectivity initiative launched 
by President Xi Jinping in 2013. To date more than one hundred countries have endorsed 
China’s flagship initiative, despite criticism received from the United States (US). 
However, the European Union (EU) does not seem to have a clear position towards the 
BRI. While 14 individual EU member states have already signed bilateral cooperation 
agreements with China on the BRI, some other member states are not so supportive, such 
as Germany. This paper investigates whether EU has been able to take common actions 
towards the BRI. Its hypothesis is that while the EU has been unable to find a common 
approach towards the BRI through its foreign policy, it has been able to do so through its 
trade policy with the introduction of the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation 
(FDISR). In order to examine that, both a qualitative content analysis of EU official 
documents and a literature review of the FDISR are conducted. The results indicate that 
the hypothesis cannot be rejected and that the EU itself is evolving towards a more 
protectionist approach in order to deal with growing Chinese influence.  
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The international trade environment has entered a new era of global protectionism and 
isolationism, mainly led by the UK with its Brexit and the US under President Trump 
Administration. Meanwhile, in this context characterised by increased protectionist 
stances, China claims to be a country that defends and supports globalization by 
promoting international cooperation and free trade. In this regard, in 2013, the Chinese 
President Xi proposed one of the most ambitious initiative ever suggested since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China, the so-called Belt Road Initiative (BRI). 
According to the Chinese president, the BRI is a global initiative that seeks to benefit all 
parties involved; he refers to the initiative as a win-win cooperation. This initiative alludes 
to the old Silk Road. Back in the days, it was a network of trade routes that connected 
China with Europe. Therefore, the BRI aims to revive the ancient trading routes between 
the two continents, mainly investing in infrastructures in Asia, Europe and Africa. 
 
The initiative has certainly attracted attention. To date more than one hundred countries 
have endorsed president Xi’s flagship initiative, despite criticism received from the 
United States (US). The US is clearly against the Chinese initiative mainly for two 
reasons. On the one hand, its government claims that the initiative’s opaque financing 
could lead to unsustainable debt in the developing countries along the road. On the other 
hand, it also argues that the BRI has a geopolitical objective: to export China’s norms and 
standards. In short, the US fears that the BRI is an attempt to challenge US’s hegemony. 
However, the European Union (EU) does not seem to have a clear position towards the 
initiative proposed by China. Since the launch of the initiative, 14 individual EU member 
states have signed a BRI Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (not binding) with 
China. The most recent and important EU country to endorse the BRI is Italy (in March 
2019). Italy is not the first EU country to sign, but by far is the largest EU economy and 
the first G7 country to do so. In contrast, some other countries in the EU are not so 
supportive regarding the BRI. For example, the German Minister Sigmar Gabriel warned 
in February 2018 that the BRI is China’s attempt to promote values different from the 
western system.  
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether the EU has been able to take common 
actions regarding the BRI. The hypothesis is that while the EU has been unable to reach 
a common position towards BRI through its foreign policy, it has been able to respond as 
one through its trade policy. The methodology to test the hypothesis is straightforward: 
review of the official publications issued by the EU on the BRI as well as an assessment 
of whether the introduction of the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation 
(FDISR) in EU’s trade policy was an answer to BRI. The former is done through 




screening mechanism. The hypothesis would be rejected if the official documents 
analysed state an EU position on the BRI (either in favour or against). It would also be 
rejected if the literature does not link the EU FDISR with the BRI. In order to accept the 
hypothesis, the documents analysed must use a vague language towards the BRI and the 
literature must reveal that the establishment of the FDISR in EU’s trade policy was as an 
answer to BRI. 
 
This paper is organized in five parts. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of the BRI and its 
implications for the EU. Chapter 2 explains the EU and its foreign and trade policies. The 
chapter 3 justifies and explains the method applied in this paper to test the hypothesis. 




















I. BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE  
 
China plays nowadays an important role at the international economic landscape, as it has 
been the largest contributor to the world growth since the financial crisis of 2008 (World 
Bank, 2019). The country started its reforms and opening up policies in 1978 and 
transformed from a centrally planned economy to a more market based economy. Since 
then, China has experienced a rapid economic growth and at the same time impressive 
social development. Since the country’s opening up until 2010, its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) grew at an average speed of almost 10% per year (Morrison, 2018). 
However, in recent years, the growth of the Chinese economy has been moderating. In 
2018, China’s GDP reached 13.6 trillion USD, representing an annual growth of 6.5% 
(World Bank, 2019). According to estimates of the International Monetary Fund (2019), 
China’s GDP is expected to grow 6.3% in 2019 and 6.1% in 2020. Despite the country’s 
GDP slowdown, China still is one of the biggest economies in the world. In terms of 
purchasing parity, it is the largest. 
 
In January 2017 at the Davos Forum, Chinese President Xi gave a speech expressing its 
commitment to support and promote economic opening up and made clear his anti-
protectionism position. He claimed that while the US under the Trump administration is 
looking inward and building walls, China tries to improve connectivity among different 
economies by building infrastructures such as bridges, roads and ports with the launch of 
the BRI in 2013. This chapter is devoted to present the BRI and is structured in three 
sections. The first introduces the BRI concept by explaining its origin and geographical 
coverage. The next section then describes the objectives that the BRI is aimed to achieve 
and presents its funding mechanisms as well as its expected impact. The third section is 
devoted to explain the pros and cons of China’s megaproject from the EU perspective.  
  
 
1. The origin and coverage of the BRI 
 
The BRI alludes to the ancient Silk Road, back in the days it was a network of trade routes 
that connected China with Europe. The reference to the ancient Silk Road was clearly not 
chosen by chance, as it reminds to the images of a peaceful and diverse exchange from 
prosperous Eurasian continent (Rolland, 2019). The term “Silk Road” was firstly 
introduced by the German geologist Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877. Prior to that, the 
network that connected the East to the West had no specific name (Chanda, 2015). 
 
The Silk Road came into being during China’s expansion to the West that took place 
during the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220CE) (Chatzky and McBride, 2019). Specifically, 




China with Central and Western Asia, Africa and Europe, from the 2nd century BCE to 
the 15th century CE (UNESCO, 2019). The usage of the routes intensified and reached 
its peak during the Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE), which is considered one of the most 
prosperous dynasties in China. The Silk Road was composed of a network of routes both 
by land and sea, linking East and West which allowed the trade for merchandising and 
commodities. Luxury goods such as silk, spices, jade and other products were moved to 
the West while China obtained gold and other precious materials as metal and ivory 
(Chatzky and McBride, 2019). Remarkably, silk was one of the major products 
transported from China to the West since the Roman Empire period. However, those 
networks were not only limited to the trade of merchandising and commodities but also 
intellectual and cultural exchange of the civilizations involved along the route was taking 
place (UNESCO, 2019). 
 
In the autumn of 2013, Chinese President Xi announced the launch of both the Silk 
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Collectively, these two routes 
are called in Chinese as Yi Dai Yi Lu 一带一路 which literally means “one belt one road”. 
In 2017, the Chinese government decided to change the official English translation from 
One Belt, One Road (OBOR) to the now commonly known Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI). The initial name was considered confusing for foreigners as they consistently 
made misinterpretations on the meaning. They tended focus exclusively on word “one” 
and assumed there is only a single network. In addition, the world “initiative” has been 
included into the official translation with the aim to make the slogan sound more inclusive 
rather than a strategy (Shepard, 2017; Stanzel, 2017).  
 
The BRI is considered as the most significant international project that China has ever 
suggested (South China Morning Post, 2015). In the early years after the BRI’s launch, 
Chinese sources often mentioned that the initiative spans a massive geographic area 
covering between 60 and 65 countries (Rolland, 2019). The area represents about 65% of 
world’s population, one third world’s GDP and 40% of global trade (World Bank, 2019). 
According to official sources, so far 123 countries and 29 international organizations has 
signed cooperation documents (Belt and Road Portal, 2019). Some experts hold the view 
that BRI has the potential to become the world’s largest platform for regional 
collaboration (McKinsey&Company, 2016).  
  
The initiative is centred on two main corridors, as Figure 1 illustrates, one over land and 
one over the sea. Regarding the latter, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road links economies 
in Asia, Africa, and Europe by sea routes. Specifically, it connects the coastal China to 
the Mediterranean through Singapore and Malaysia, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea 
and the Strait of Hormuz. The maritime road is supported by upgrades to ports and 




Central Asia. This route focuses on the connectivity of world’s largest economies by 
building large scale infrastructures, such as the construction of high speed rail links. 
According to the official Belt and Road Portal (2019), the Silk Economic Belt is a land 
corridor  composed by the following six international economic cooperation corridors, 
namely: (1) New Eurasian Land Bridge that connects the west region of China with the 
west region of Russia, (2) China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor that connects the north 
region of China to east region of Russia via Mongolia, (3) China–Central Asia–West Asia 
Corridor that links the western China to Turkey via central and west Asia, (4) China–
Indochina Peninsula Corridor that links the south region of China to Singapore through 
Indo-China, (5) China–Pakistan Corridor that links south western China via Pakistan to 
Arabia sea routes, and (6) Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Corridor that links 
southern China to India through Bangladesh and Myanmar. While improving Asia – 
Europe connectivity, these corridors are expected to play a significant role in setting up 
and strengthening the partnership among several countries.  
 
Figure 1. Planned routes for the Belt and Road Initiative 
 
Source: China Daily, 2018.  
 
 
2. The BRI’s objectives, funding and expected impact 
 
According to the official outline published in 2015, “Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, the BRI has 
five major goals, namely policy co-ordination, connectivity of facilities, unimpeded trade, 




connect participating members’ states infrastructure, align their economic development 
policies to China’s, encourage them to open their markets to facilitate trade, connect their 
financial markets to China’s and strengthen people to people links (Mercator Institute for 
China Studies, 2018). By so doing, the initiative aims to promote the connectivity 
between Asia, Europe and Africa and their adjacent seas, stablish and strengthen 
partnerships among the countries along the BRI and to achieve sustainable development. 
 
Several financial mechanisms are expected to support the huge investments in 
development of infrastructure involved (such as railways, roadways, highways, maritime 
ports, energy pipelines and power grids in countries along the BRI). They can be 
classified under the following headings: Chinese policy banks, state-owned enterprise 
banks, state owned enterprises in the energy and infrastructure sectors and large 
multinational financial institutions (Lau, Sun and Li, 2018). China Development Bank 
(CDB) and Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) are the main Chinese policy banks 
that fund the BRI. On the one hand, CDB, which China’s biggest foreign investment 
bank, provided 183 billion USD by the end 2017 to fund BRI projects (Hallgren and 
Abeleen, 2019). On the other hand, CEXIM provided 118 billion USD loans to finance 
BRI projects by March 2018 (Hallgren and Abeleen, 2019). The three largest state-owned 
banks, namely Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China (BOC) 
and China Construction Bank (CCB) had provided a total sum about 200 billion USD to 
fund BRI projects by the end 2016 (Peng and Jia 2017). Furthermore, a state-owned 
investment fund was launched at the end of 2014, named the Silk Road Fund, with an 
initial capital of around 40 billion USD (Lau, Sun and Li, 2018). Regarding large 
international financial institutions, the most important contributor is the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2015 and led by China, with an 
initial capital of 100 billion USD (McKinsey&Company, 2016). It mostly co-funds 
projects with other international development finance institutions such as the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank (Rolland, 2019). In addition, in 2014 the New 
Development Bank was established by the BRIC countries, with an initial capital of 100 
billion USD (McKinsey&Company, 2016). According Morgan Stanley (2018) estimates, 
China’s total investment over the life of the BRI could reach 1.2 to 1.3 trillion USD by 
2027.  
 
This impressive infrastructure led economic integration megaproject (Du and Zhang, 
2017) is expected to have a positive impact on the region. It is expected to reduce the 
Asia-Pacific region infrastructure funding gap that according to a report from Asian 
Development Bank (2017), amounts to 26 trillion USD (1.7 trillion USD annually) over 
the period from 2016 to 2030. With the launch of the BRI, therefore, region will greatly 
benefit from China’s initiative in terms of infrastructure development. Another expected 




international cooperation on investment and construction, finance, research and 
development, medicine, science and technology, cultural and academic exchange among 
others (Müller-Markus, 2016). It is expected to reduce the first and to enhance the second. 
According to a recent study from the World Bank (2018), if the BRI is eventually 
completed, it could reduce travel times by 12% for economies along corridors and reduce 
trade costs between 1.1% and 2.2%. In addition, the initiative would contribute to the 
world growth at least by 0.10%. Furthermore, the study shows that non participating 
countries would also benefit from the improved infrastructure, increasing global trade 
between 1.7% and 6.2%. 
 
Few would deny that China obtains clear benefits from the initiative. These benefits are 
not only economic but also geopolitical. As to the former, BRI would allow China to 
create alternative trade routes to guarantee the supply of energy and primary materials 
that are essential for China’s economic and social growth (Chatzky and McBride, 2019). 
Currently China depends on a single maritime access. An estimated 85% of Chinese 
energy imports pass though the Straight of Malacca, which has been in a context of 
territorial conflicts with strong US presence (Müller- Markus, 2016).  The BRI can also 
provide new markets for products that have a saturated demand in China. In this regard, 
the BRI can be a way of reducing industrial oversupply in sectors such as cement and 
steel manufacturer that suffer a huge overcapacity and require new overseas demand 
(Cooley, 2016). Finally, the BRI is a tool for tackling socio-economic differences 
between inland and coastal regions within China (Rolland, 2019), and to create more 
stability in the conflictive areas along the route, such as Xinjiang province (Müller- 
Markus, 2016).  
 
Regarding geopolitical benefits, outside of China, Xi’s initiative has been interpreted as 
a strategy to increase China’s influence in its regional neighbourhood and beyond. 
According some commentators (Chanda, 2015; Economy, 2018) the BRI reflects China’s 
power ambitions in the 21st century and aims to shape international norms and 
institutions. At the same time, the BRI is considered as a strategy to in order to hedge 
against the eastward move of the US, launched during the Obama administration in 2011 
(Qiao, 2015). Moreover, some observers claim that the BRI is the Chinese Marshall Plan 
for Asia (Tiezzi, 2014), a tool for China to build an alliance among the beneficiaries’ 
countries to confront the West (Bin, 2018). This interpretation of BRI has, of course, been 
denied by the Chinese government. In 2015, the Chinese foreign minister argued that BRI 
is a platform for cooperation and not a geopolitical tool and rejected the comparison 






3. The BRI pros and cons from the EU perspective 
 
The EU has achieved the highest level of integration among a group neighbouring 
countries and plays a remarkably important strategic role in the international arena. 
According to the official Belt and Road Portal (2018), despite the Brexit, the EU has been 
committed to achieve greater integration and constantly overcome new challenges and 
played a major role in both regional and international affairs.  
 
China encourages the EU participation in the BRI (Belt and Road Portal, 2018). China’s 
largest trading partner is the EU and China is the EU’s second largest trading partner 
(European Commission, 2019). According to China, the two sides are indispensable 
partners to each other and important global players. The two together represent one 
quarter of the global population and account for one third of the world’s economy 
(Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union 2019).  According to 
the official Belt and Road Portal (2018), China and the EU are major contributors to 
economic globalization and share common interests in several aspects such as world 
peace and stability, promoting global prosperity and sustainable development.  
 
A number of academic publications suggest that from the EU’s perspective, there are 
several potential positive outcomes that the EU can benefit from joining the BRI 
(Casarini, 2015; Garcia and Xu, 2016; Wang, 2015). By narrowing the existing 
infrastructure gap between Western and Eastern EU through the construction or 
improvement of transport infrastructure, the BRI megaproject could significantly 
diminish shipping times and costs for trade within the EU and with Asia (Casarini, 2015; 
Garcia and Xu, 2016). Moreover, the EU can also benefit from the initiative by having 
access to new markets in whole Eurasia area. Finally, the BRI paves the way for the EU 
to have the opportunity to pursue its geostrategic ambitions through cooperation along 
the land-based road, such as EU-Russia reconciliation (Wang, 2015). 
 
Regarding the cons, some commentators have pointed out that the BRI could lead to trade 
deficit for the EU (Müller-Markus, 2016). This is explained by the fact that currently 
trains arrive from China to Warsaw with tonnes of Chinese products, however, trains 
return back to China half empty. In addition, it could also foster anti-Chinese perceptions. 
In recent years, the EU has faced a growing Chinese acquisition of European businesses. 
In 2016, these investments reached to 41.15 billion USD (Ivana, 2017). Chinese investors 
acquire business from strategic sectors, such as nuclear, aeronautical, energy, automobile, 
banking and telecommunications (Müller-Markus, 2016). As a result, in 2017, Germany, 
France and Italy put pressure on the European institutions to develop a new mechanism 
for closer analysis and review of Chinese investments in Europe (Zeneli, 2019). After 




screening of foreign direct investments officially entered into force on 10th April 2019. 
This system of screening aims to protect EU from foreign investments, notably from 
China, in strategic sectors such as technologies and infrastructure (Reuters, 2019).   
 
Some observers hold the view that China is playing divide and conquer strategy, by 
dealing with EU member states bilaterally and avoiding the EU’s institutions (Jonquières, 
2015). China would be taking the advantage of the lack of EU level coordination when 
forming a joint policy to face new changes to the international order on the European 
region (Müller-Markus, 2016). Until recently, China’s infrastructure investment in 
Europe was carefully targeting select group of countries such as the “16+1” rather than 
whole EU. In 2012, “16+1” economic platform was created between China and Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, specifically formed by 11 EU member states 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) and five EU candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). Its aim is to build and improve 
transport infrastructure in the region. It was launched with EU’s displeasure as it lacked 
of previous consultation at the EU level (Müller-Markus, 2016). More recently, other EU 
countries also joined the China’s BRI megaproject, Greece (August 2018), Portugal 
(January 2019) and Italy (April 2019).  
 
At the end of 2018, the European Commission launched its own strategy for infrastructure 
development with Asia named as “Connecting Europe and Asia – Building Blocks for an 
EU Strategy”. The strategy’s aim is to create an EU engagement framework based on 
Western economic and institutional norms and principle. According to the EU’s officials, 
this connectivity strategy is not a response to the BRI.  However, it surely appears to be 





During the last few decades China has become one of the world’s most important 
economies. The BRI provides an opportunity for China to play a leading role at the global 
landscape. Therefore, in a context of rising protectionism, China has the opportunity to 
occupy the spaces left by other powers and to develop into the biggest driving force of 
globalization with the BRI. The Chinese initiative is welcomed by an important number 
of EU’s member states, as so far there are already 14 individual EU member states that 
joined to the initiative. However, there are also signs of increasing distrust with 




II. THE EU FOREIGN AND TRADE POLICY  
 
The EU is the most ambitious regional integration ever reached without being a state. 
Since its origin which dates back to the 1950s, the EU has evolved significantly both in 
terms of introduction of new competences and the accession of new member states. In 
integration terms, it has evolved from Custom Union among six countries in 1968 to 
nowadays 28 members’ Single Market. As a result, the EU is considered as a major 
economic and trading power in the world (European Union, 2019). In terms of GDP, the 
EU is the largest economy. In 2018, it was estimated to be 18.8 trillion USD, representing 
about 22% of the global economy (World Bank, 2019). In global trade, the EU is the 
largest trading power with 15.1% of world imports and 15.2 % of world exports, ahead 
of China (13.8% and 16.4% respectively) and the US (16.4% and 10.9% respectively) 
(European Commission, 2019).  
 
The EU trade power is not only the result of an increasing internal economic integration 
between an expanding number of member states but also of speaking with a single voice 
in trade matters (European Commission, 2019). Yet, while the EU’s foreign policy has 
also evolved, it has done so to much lesser extent. The EU’s foreign policy scope (outside 
of trade matters) is quite limited and it is commonly considered as weak and 
underdeveloped in comparison to EU’s trade policy. This chapter aims to present the EU 
foreign and trade policy. In order to do so, it is divided in four parts. First, it introduces 
the EU’s origin and how its foreign and trade policies have evolved over time. Then, it 
follows by presenting the current EU’s foreign policy (in force since the Lisbon Treaty). 
Section three explores the EU trade policy. Finally, in the last section conclusions are 
presented.   
 
	  
1. The EU’s origin and its foreign and trade policies evolution  
 
The EU traces its origins back to the 1950s, with the formation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), under the Treaty of Paris which entered into force in 1952. It 
was signed by six European countries, namely Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and West Germany. It was established by the founding members with the 
aim to prevent further wars in the region, as it was believed that by creating a 
supranational entity to supervise the production and commercialization of cool and steel 
(industries essentials for war) is a way to secure peace. A custom union for coal, iron and 
steel was created for a period of 50 years. It is worth noticing that since very beginning, 





Later, in 1958, the Treaty of Rome came in force and the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were established. As result, 
during that time three different integration organizations coexisted in Europe, collectively 
referred as the European Communities (EC). The focus of the largest (the EEC) was on 
the establishment of the common agricultural policy as well as the abolition of trade 
barriers between its members. In 1968, the custom union was completed. The creation of 
the custom union entailed removal of tariffs among member states and common customs 
tariff on imports from third countries. As a result, this implies the necessity of the 
establishment of a common commercial policy since trade relations with third countries 
must be managed at the EEC level. The EC started expanding its members in the 1970s. 
The first enlargement took place in 1973 with the joining of three new members: 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.  
 
It was in 1970 that the process of European integration stepped down to the path towards 
foreign policy, with the emergence of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Barbé, 
2014). The latter was the EC’s foreign policy coordination mechanism and enabled the 
first steps towards a harmonized diplomacy of the member’s states. The EPC was created 
with the goal of having Europe’s voice to be heard in the world. It was a success in that 
it allowed the EC to be an active player in specific issues on the international scene such 
as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Middle East Conflict 
(Gainar, 2017). However, the EPC was an informal process of cooperation, as no member 
state could be made to join it and the actions were not coordinated.  
 
The next steps towards the present EU were given in the following two treaty revisions: 
the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. Having expanded southwards, to 
Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986), the EC revised its founding treaties in the 
mid-1980s. In 1986, the Single European Act solidified the principles of the EU’s foreign 
policy (including the ECP into the Treaty) and formalized the idea of a single European 
market to enter into force in January 1993. Some years later, the so-called Maastricht 
Treaty formally introduced the objective of having a Foreign and Security Policy. 
Through this Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, the EC was included into a larger 
organization: the EU. While the EC constituted the economic integration pillar (or First 
Pillar) of this organization and established the stages to create the euro, the EU also 
included two more pillars: one for Foreign and Security Policy (the so-called Second 
Pillar) and another for Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (the so-
called Third Pillar). The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was expected to 
help tackle the EPC limitations; the latter was criticised for being excessively reactive 
and declaratory, lacking in proactivity and instruments that allow to follow up 





After the Maastricht Treaty there have been further enlargements of the EU as well as 
further EU reforms. As to the former, in 1995, three further countries joined the EU: 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. In 2004, 10 more countries joined to the EU: Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Bulgaria and Romania gained access in 2007. The most recent accession was the case of 
Croatia, in 2013. Today, the EU consists of 28 member states yet Brexit (the exit of the 
United Kingdom from the EU) may take place later this year. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty has subsequently been further amended by the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999), the Nice Treaty (2003) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009). The EU faced a necessity 
to reform its institutional framework on foreign policy for the three reasons (Morillas, 
2014). Firstly, the EU needed to provide an answer to the integration of new member 
states due to the disappearance of Soviet Union. Secondly, due to the EU’s high 
institutional complexity and growing distancing from the EU citizens, the EU governance 
system needed to be improved. Lastly, even with the introduction of the CFSP at the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the figure of High Representative in 1999, the UE did not 
yet have optimal mechanisms to become decisive at the international landscape. While 
some proposed to create the figure of Minister of Foreign Affairs, several countries were 
against that idea, especially the United Kingdom. As a result, progress was exclusively 
made on institutional mechanisms of coordination of EU’s external action.  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force in 2009, replaced the three-pillared 
structure that had been introduced by the Maastricht Treaty by a single structure for both 
economic integration and political integration (foreign and security policy and justice and 
home affairs). In the field of EU’s foreign policy, the Lisbon Treaty re-enforced the figure 
of the now High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
established the European External Action Service (EEAS), and inserted new 
responsibilities on foreign policy for the European Council and its President. From the 
EU’s trade policy perspective, the Treaty of Lisbon also introduced major changes: it 
increased the exclusive competence of the EU, areas such as Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) were added to the common commercial policy. At the same time, the European 
Parliament acquired new powers in the implementation of trade policy and in the 
conclusion of international trade agreements (European Commission, 2011).  
 
 
2. The intergovernmental nature of EU’s foreign policy  
 
As explained in the previous section, the EU’s foreign policy has evolved during the last 
decades and currently it is based on the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Following the 




comparison to other EU projects, such as trade policy (Lehne, 2017). One of the main 
constraints to EU’s foreign policy is its decision making process. Decisions regarding 
foreign and security are taken by unanimity by the member states in the Council of 
Ministers. As one can imagine, this is difficult for such a large group of countries with 
divergent interests. In fact, in 2017, the European Commission President proposed 
foreign policy decisions to be made based on majority voting system. However, very few 
member states seem ready to do that, as it implies to subordinate national law to the one 
of the EU (Lehne, 2017). In any case, today’s EU’s foreign policy is grounded on four 
figures: the Council of Ministers, the High Representative (in charge of the EEAS), the 
European Council and the President of the European Council. 
 
2.1. Council of the European Union 
 
The Council of the European Union, otherwise known as the Council of Ministers, is one 
of the main decision maker bodies of the EU (EEAS, 2019). Meetings are carried out by 
one minister from each member state according to the policy area to be discussed. 
Member states and the European Commission may refer to the Council of Minister any 
question related to the CFSP and may suggest proposals to it. The Council of Ministers 
meets at least once a month to discuss, amend and adopt law and coordinate policies 
(European Union, 2019). Its president rotates between member states every six months. 
In the case of the Foreign Affairs Council, the position is chaired by the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the figure is explained in detail 
in the next section). 
 
The Council of Ministers, or more concretely the Foreign Affairs Council (when dealing 
issues related to CFSP), is responsible for adopting CFSP Decisions. Before the Treaty 
of Lisbon, there used to be a clear distinction between two most important types of legal 
instruments: the joint action and the common position. The joint action refers to the 
specific situation when operational action by the EU is considered necessary (CSFP 
missions and/or sanctions). As stated in the Article 14 of the Treaty on EU, a joint action 
commits the member states in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity. 
On the other hand, the common position relates to the approach of the EU to a particular 
matter (specific geographical o thematic issue). As stated in the Article 15 of the Treaty 
on EU, common positions commit member states to assure that their national policies 
conform to the common position. However, after the Treaty of Lisbon, the distinction 
between the described two types of decisions are no longer existent, as every decision is 
called a Decision of the Council (Federal Foreign Office, 2019).  
 





The position of the High Representative for the CFSP was originally created in 1999, 
when the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force. Javier Solana was the first holder of the 
post and simultaneously the Secretary General of the Council of the EU, from 1999 until 
2009. The Treaty of Lisbon redefined the post of High Representative and separated the 
position from the office of Secretary General of the Council of the EU. In addition, the 
treaty expanded the role, by adding significant new responsibilities to the post. Since then, 
the post is known as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR). Nowadays, the incoming HR is Josep Borrell who is going to begin his five-year 
mandate in December 2019. He will succeed Federica Mogherini who was appointed to 
the post for the period from 2014 until 2019. Previously, Catherine Aston held the 
position between 2009 and 2014.  
 
The HR is the person who is in charge of the CFSP, conducts the Foreign Affairs Council 
and at the same time is one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission. The 
combination of these roles is expected to help the HR to coordinate and ensure coherence 
in EU’s foreign policy (EEAS, 2019). In particular, EU’s foreign policy should not 
conflict or overlap in areas such as trade, development, neighbourhood policy and 
humanitarian aid where the European Commission has important responsibilities. 
Accordingly, the HR is in charge of external relations and coordination of other aspects 
regarding the EU’s external action. The post of HR is appointed by the European Council 
and the President of the Commission must be in agreement with the choice, for a period 
of five years. 
 
In order to support to the HR in carrying out its mission, the EEAS was created by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, formally launched in 2011. The EEAS works in cooperation with EU 
member countries’ diplomatic services. It is based in Brussels but counts with a network 
of EU Delegations with worldwide presence. In addition, the EEAS also provides 
assistance to the President of the European Council, the President of the Council of EU 
and to members of the European Commission when they are dealing with their respective 
functions in the area of external relations (EEAS, 2019).  
 
2.3. The European Council  
 
The European Council was established in 1974 as an informal forum for discussion 
between heads of government or state of the EU member states. Promptly, it developed a 
role as the body responsible for setting EU goals and priorities (European Council, 2019). 
When the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, the European Council acquired a formal 
status for the first time. In 2009, following the changes inserted by the Lisbon Treaty, the 





The European Council sets the EU's overall political direction and priorities. It comprises 
the heads of state or government of the 28 EU member states, the European Council 
President and the President of the European Commission. In addition, the HR also 
participates in European Council meetings when foreign affairs issues are debated. The 
European Council has no (formal) legislative power, so does not (formally) negotiate or 
adopt EU laws. The European Commission remains the unique initiator of legislation, but 
as stated in the Treaty on EU (Article 15) the European Council is able to provide an 
impetus to guide and define general political directions and priorities.  
 
The meetings of the European Council, commonly referred as “EU summits”, are held in 
Brussels. Meetings are chaired by the President European Council and meets at least twice 
every six months. The President of the European Parliament attends the start of each 
meeting, to outline the European Parliament's views. Other people are also invited to the 
meetings, such as the President of the European Central Bank. Decisions of the European 
Council are mostly taken by consensus, except for some specific cases outlined in the EU 
treaties. If a vote is taken, neither the President of the European Council nor the President 
of the European Commission take part (European Council, 2019). 
 
The European Council defines the EU's policy agenda, traditionally by adopting 
“conclusions” during European Council meetings which identify issues relevance and 
actions to take. However, more recently, the European Council adopted a “strategic 
agenda” of priority areas for longer-term defining its action.  
 
2.4. President of the European Council 
 
The figure of President of the European Council was introduced when Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force. Previously, the head of European Council was referred as President in 
office of the European Council and was an unofficial position. Herman Van Rompuy was 
appointed the first full-time President of the European Council, from 2009 until 2014.  
Since December 2014, the current President of the European Council is Donald Tusk. 
However, from December 2019 Charles Michael is expected to replace Donald Tusk 
position. The President of the European Council is the person who is responsible for 
overseeing and driving forward the work of the European Council as the key 
representative of the EU on the world stage. As stated in the Article 15 of the Treaty on 
EU, the president’s role is mainly political, which includes preparing the work of the 
European Council, chairing its meetings, helping to facilitate cohesion and consensus 
among its members and reporting to the European Parliament after each meeting. In 
addition, the President acts as external representation of the EU at the level of heads of 
government and state at three types of international summits: bilateral summits, 




same time, the Presidents also represents on issues related to the EU CFSP along with the 
HR who helps put into effect the CFSP and ensure its unity, consistency and effectiveness 
(European Council, 2019). 
 
The President of the European Council is elected by the European Council and requires 
a qualified majority. In order to obtain a qualified majority, two conditions require to be 
met: supported by at least 55% of member states and representing at least of 65% of the 
total EU population. It is elected for a 2.5-year term, which is renewable once. In 
agreement with established practice, the rotating presidency is responsible for the 
coordination of the election process. During the European Council, when discusses the 
election of the President, the presidency that chairs this part of the meeting it is 
represented by the head of state or government (European Council, 2019). 
 
 
3. The supranational nature of EU’s trade policy  
	  
The EU’s trade policy differs critically from EU’s foreign policy because the EU has 
nearly exclusive competence for trade policy issues. This means that the EU as a whole, 
instead of individual member states, has the power to legislate on trade related matters 
and conclude international agreements (European Parliament, 2019). This exclusive EU 
competence today covers trade in goods, trade in services (with an exception for 
transport), commercial aspects of intellectual property and FDI (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 
2018). By acting together with a single voice on trade issues, rather than with multiple 
separate individual trade strategies, the EU obtains a strong position when it comes to 
global trade (General Secretariat of the Council, 2019). 
 
However, at the beginning, the exclusive competence only covered trade in goods. The 
scope enlarged gradually through several treaty revisions. The EU competence in trade 
matters remained almost unchanged until the Treaty of Amsterdam, when an enabling 
clause was introduced that allowed the EU to have the competence to negotiate and 
conclude negotiations on services and intellectual property (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 2018). 
While the enabling clause implied that the member states would decide on ad-hoc basis 
where to extend the exclusive EU competence on these two new areas (Güçlü, 2018). 
This situation was partly modified with the Treaty of Nice. It extended the EU exclusive 
competence scope to services and commercial aspects of intellectual property rights. 
However, politically sensitive areas, such as cultural and audiovisual services remained 
a shared competence between the EU and its member states (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 2018). 
The Treaty of Nice also introduced an enabling clause to extend EU competence to non-
commercial aspects of intellectual property rights. Undoubtedly, the most relevant 




2010). It extended the coverage of the common commercial policy to cover FDI. In 
addition, politically sensitive sectors previously excluded from EU exclusive competence 
have been added, with exception of transport services (Güçlü, 2018).  
 
The direction of the EU’s trade policy is defined in cooperation between three EU 
institutions: the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European 
Parliament. Trade agreements negotiated by the European Commission are adopted 
following their approval by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. In 
addition, business and other societal stakeholders and government of third countries are 
also important actors in the EU’s trade policy (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 2018). However, in 
reality only large corporations and their lobbyists usually have a significant influence 
over the EU’s trade policy (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007). 
 
3.1. European Commission  
 
The European Commission was established in 1958 and is composed by 28 
commissioners (one from each EU country) and including its President. Currently, the 
head of the European Commission is Jean-Claude Junker. In December 2019, Ursula von 
der Leyen will take the office. The President of the European Commission chairs the 
weekly meetings and sets its policy agenda (European Commission, 2019). The European 
Commission promotes the general interest of the EU, with complete independence from 
national governments, by proposing and enforcing legislation. It also oversees the 
implementation of EU law and executes the EU budged. In addition, it also speaks for the 
EU around the world in areas that not covered by the CFSP, such as trade policy (Eur-
lex, 2019).  
 
In the area of the EU trade policy, the European Commission prepares and proposes 
positions to take in relations with third countries and negotiates trade agreements on 
behalf of the EU member states (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2019). In 
addition, the European Commission also speaks on behalf of the EU with international 
organizations, in particular the World Trade Organization (WTO). While all member 
states of the EU are individually members of the WTO, the EU negotiates in the WTO as 
a single body (and is also a member of the WTO). Furthermore, the European 
Commission also proposes the legal acts to implement the common commercial policy, 
and it issues decisions when applying EU’s trade policy instruments, such as anti-
dumpling measures (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 2018).  
 
Within the European Commission, the Trade Commissioner and the Directorate-General 
for trade (DG Trade) are the key players responsible for setting out the EU trade policy. 




the trade negotiations and also represents the EU within the WTO. Phil Hogan will take 
up Malmström’s role in December 2019. DG Trade, which is subdivided into eight 
directorates, is responsible for drafting proposals and getting opinions of the economic 
sector concerned and of the member states (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 2018).  
 
3.2. Council of the European Union  
 
In the field of EU’s trade policy, the Council of the EU has the power to authorize the 
European Commission to open negotiations with third countries and conduct them under 
certain conditions, in other words, the European Commission need to receive a mandate 
previously from the Council of the EU to be able to start negotiations (European 
Parliament, 2019).  
 
The Council of the EU has two important committees on trade policy: the Trade Policy 
Committee (TPC) and the Working Parties on Trade (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 2018). The 
TPC assists and guides the European Commission in the process of negotiation and gives 
advice on the common commercial policy. All the Member States are represented in the 
TPC, which meets in Brussels every week (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2019). 
The Working Parties on Trade deal with internal trade legislation and the application of 
the EU’s trade policy instruments. Qualified majority voting is the general rule in Council 
of the EU for all aspects of trade policy, however unanimity is still required in specific 
circumstances, i.e. where politically sensitive services are tacked (European Commission, 
2011).  
 
3.3. European Parliament   
 
The European Parliament is responsible for legislative, supervisory and budgetary duties. 
It is the only directly-elected EU body by EU citizens every five years. Its representatives 
are named Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The number of MEPs for each 
member state is roughly proportionate to its population, under the condition that no 
country can have fewer than 6 or more than 96 MEPs within a total of 751 members 
(European Union, 2019). The President who is elected for a renewable two years and a 
half, represents the European Parliament outside the world and with other EU institutions. 
David Maria Sassoli is the current President.  
 
The European Parliament’s work is conducted in two main stages. First, the committees 
examine proposals for legislation and prepare the work for plenary sessions. Then, at the 
plenary session is when all the MEPs gather to vote whether to approve or not the 
proposed legislation. In regards with the EU’s trade policy area, the preparation work for 





The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) increased the European Parliament’s power, among others 
issues, over the EU trade policy. Since 2009, international trade agreements can only 
enter into force if the Parliament votes in favour of them (European Parliament, 2019). 
When the European Commission suggests to initiate negotiations for international trade 
agreement, it is not required the authorization by the European Parliament. However, the 
European Parliament has the right to be informed at all stages while the negotiations take 
place. The Council of the EU and the European Parliament and are co-legislators, this 
means that both institutions have to ratify the negotiated agreement. Given this 
ratification requisite, the European Commission has a strong interest to ensure that the 
European Parliament supports the negotiations from the beginning (Gstöhl and De 
Bièvre, 2018). In order to conclude an agreement, the Council of the EU needs to receive 
the European Parliament’s consent, in other words, when a simple majority vote in 
plenary is obtained (European Parliament, 2019).  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Since its origins in 1950s, the EU has focused on the trade aspect and its competence has 
evolved significantly. Originally, the EU exclusive competence was basically trade in 
goods. However, over the years through different treaty revisions (specially the Treaty of 
Lisbon), EU exclusive competence extended to include trade in services, commercial 
aspects of intellectual property and FDI. This existence of common commercial policy at 
supranational level, has enabled the EU have one voice on trade matters. However, the 
EU’s foreign policy remains weak and underdeveloped. The EU began to work on its 
foreign policy in the 1970s. Later, in the 1990s a key contribution in the area was the 
creation of the CFSP and the introduction of the HR figure. While the Treaty of Lisbon 
has further strengthened the capacities of the EU, the decision making process of its 
foreign policy continues to be based on unanimity limiting the capacity to speak with a 
single voice. Therefore, organizing a unified voice on the BRI seems to be a hard task for 









This paper aims to investigate whether EU has been able to take common actions towards 
the BRI. Its hypothesis is that the EU has responded as one to the BRI through its trade 
policy. While the EU has been unable to reach an official position towards the BRI 
through its foreign policy, it has been able to reach agreement in the area of trade policy. 
The methodology used to test the hypothesis is a review of the official documents of the 
EU on the BRI as well as an assessment of whether the introduction of the FDISR in EU’s 
trade policy was an answer to BRI. The former is done through qualitative content 
analysis and the latter through a review of the literature on the FDI screening mechanism. 
The present chapter aims to present and justify this methodology. It is divided in three 
sections. The first section revises the EU-China relations. The second section presents 
and justifies the methodology. Lastly, the conclusions are presented in the last section.  
 
 
1. EU-China relations since 1975  
 
Bilateral relations between the EU and China have developed at considerable speed since 
1975, when diplomatic ties were formally established. During the first two decades, two 
agreements were reached between the then EC and China. In 1978, the first 
intergovernmental trade agreement was signed. Later, in 1985, a new agreement was 
signed to replace the trade agreement of 1978. The 1985 agreement is a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement and is still in force. It deals with wider areas than the former one 
including not only trade but also investment, development assistance and economic 
cooperation (MOFCOM, 2019).  
 
Bilateral relations developed smoothly until 1989, when the EC decided to freeze 
relationship with China as reaction to Tiananmen incident. The EC imposed several 
sanctions, among them an arms embargo. While the interdiction of arms sales still 
remains in place, relations were setback to normal in 1992 (European Commission, 2019). 
In 1995, the EU issued its first China policy paper “A Long-term Policy for China-Europe 
Relations”. It pointed out that the EU recognises China’s rise and considers its relation 
with China as part of a long-term plan (Men, 2008). From 1995 to 2003, relations between 
the EU and China have evolved quickly in parallel with China’s reform and opening door 
policy (European Commission, 2019). Total bilateral trade reached 120 billion USD in 
2003, which doubles the amount of 1995 (Men, 2008). Since 2003, China has become the 
EU’s second largest trading partner (European Commission, 2019).  
 
From the start of the EU-China relations, the economic aspect has dominated the 




started to take shape, when the political dialogue on both regional and international level 
affairs was established. It created an institutionalised framework at the level of foreign 
ministers, ambassadors and experts (European Commission, 2019). The political aspect 
of the relation progressed even more rapidly after the establishment of the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2003 by further deepening and expanding the 
bilateral relations in a wide range of non-trade areas (EEAS, 2013).  
 
Since 1998, their bilateral relation encompasses an Annual Summit between the two sides 
that sets a strategic guidance for the relationship. It is done through three pillars that 
underpin the Summit: the high level economic and trade dialogue launched in 2007, the 
high level strategic dialogue established in 2010 and the high level people to people 
dialogue since 2012 (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 
2013). In 2007, the two sides noticed the need for a more comprehensive agreement and 
as a result they launched negotiations for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
Currently it is in deadlock mode, but if eventually negotiations are completed, it will 
replace the 1985 agreement and will serve as a legal framework for bilateral relations 
(Men, 2008).  
 
In 2013, at the 16th EU-China summit, the two sides agreed to launch negotiations for a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). According to the European Commission (2019), the 
aim of the BIT is to facilitate and eliminate the market access restrictions for investors 
from both sides. At the same time, both sides jointly adopted the “EU-China 2020 
Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, a document that guided EU-China relations from 
2013 until earlier this year. It highlights China as a vital strategic partner for the EU to 
jointly address a wide range of issues on the global agenda (Esteban and Otero, 2019). 
 
Earlier this year, the EU narrative on China has changed considerably. For the first time, 
the EU mentions China as a “systemic rival” (European Commission report issued on 
March 2019, titled “EU-China – A strategic outlook”). In addition, it also mentions that 
the EU conceives China as “strategic partner” but at the same time as a “an economic 
competitor”. It is considered as the toughest language used toward China from an official 
EU document so far (Kempe, 2019). However, in contrast to the US, it is important to 
highlight that the EU does not view China as a “strategic rival”, but instead a “systemic” 




2. Testing the EU-China relations on the BRI 
 




in different ways to the BRI: 14 of them have signed a MoU with China, others have 
made public declarations expressing misgivings. Following different commentators, as 
explained in chapter 1, from the EU perspective, endorsing the BRI has both pros and 
cons. On the one hand, the EU may be benefited from the Chinese led infrastructure 
megaproject, such as the access to new markets. On the other hand, the BRI has the 
potential to cause challenges for the EU, such as trade deficit. Therefore, at the EU level, 
it is viable to consider that the EU can be in favour or against the BRI. In addition, chapter 
2 points to the fact that while the EU has problems to speak with a single voice in foreign 
policy, its trade policy is much more mature.  
 
On the grounds of this information, the hypothesis of this work is that we should look at 
a common EU response to the BRI from its trade policy rather than from its foreign policy. 
In fact, recently the EU has introduced a new mechanism: the Foreign Direct Investment 
screening regulation (FDISR). According to OECD (2017), the EU member states 
collectively have the fewest restrictions on FDI, this means that the EU has one of the 
world’s most open regimes for FDI. However, member states agreed to become more 
protective regarding EU’s interest in the global arena with establishment of an EU-wide 
framework for FDI screening which entered into force in April 2019. Therefore, the 
regulation reflects a new position of the EU towards FDI.  
 
While the EU does not publicly claim that its target is Chinese FDI, the FDISR may be 
the answer to Chinese FDI in general and the BRI in particular. Chinese FDI into the EU 
that has increased exponentially over the last decade. The value of Chinese FDI in 2017 
(29.1 billion euros) is almost fifteen times the value in 2010 (2.1 billion euros) 
(Bickenbach and Liu, 2018; Hanemann, Huotari and Kratz, 2019). Moreover, in the 
recent years, Chinese investments are mainly targeted to key sectors, such as energy, 
automobiles, transport infrastructure and telecommunications, among others (Müller-
Markus, 2016). Several of these investments are within the framework of BRI. For 
example, in 2015, China’s acquisition of Italian tyre producer Pirelli for 7 billion euros 
was partly financed by the Chinese Silk Road Fund (Guerrero, 2017). Another example 
is the acquisition of 67% of Greece’s Port of Piraeus by the state-controlled China Ocean 
Shipping Company in 2016 (Müller-Markus, 2016). In fact, the latter is usually used as 
example by Chinese authorities as a success story of the BRI (China SCIO, 2018). 
Therefore, with the introduction of the FDISR, the EU may be trying to prevent more 
Chinese FDI from the BRI.    
 
The hypothesis to be tested includes therefore two aspects. First, the lack of a common 
EU position towards the BRI through its foreign policy. Second, the EU was able to reach 
an agreement in the area of trade policy with the introduction of the FDISR. To validate 




of the EU on the BRI through qualitative content analysis. The documents analysed they 
must use a vague language towards the BRI. In contrast, if all the documents analysed 
state clearly the position of the EU whether in favour or in contrast, then the hypothesis 
will be rejected. Regarding the second part of the hypothesis, to assess whether the 
introduction of the investment screening mechanism in EU’s trade policy was an answer 
to BRI, the method is a review of the literature on the FDISR. The hypothesis will be 
rejected if the literature does not link the EU framework for investment screening with 
the BRI at all.  
 
Literature review is a research method that allows the researcher to be able prove its 
hypothesis, as a key element of the literature review is to summarize the findings that 
have emerged from previous research efforts on a specific subject (Knopf, 2006). For the 
present paper, the literature to review has been selected through Google Scholar database. 
Four articles from well known academic journals, a policy paper and a report have been 
chosen to process the literature review due to its relevance on the topic analysed. As for 
the content analysis, this paper looks at EU official documents on BRI since 2013 until 
2019. That implies the review of the official documents issued by the EU, speeches from 
the HP, European Council Conclusions and publications from the European 
Commission’s database. The review is conducted through a qualitative content analysis 
method. Content analysis can be defined as systematic and quantitative method of 
analysis of the characteristics of a message (Neuendorf, 2002). However, other analysts 
consider is a qualitative methodology even when later certain characteristics are 
transformed into numbers (Krippendorf, 2004). Content analysis methodology allows 
researchers to come up with conclusions without influencing it. Hosty (1969) defined 
content analysis as a research technique that objectively and systematically identifies 
specified characteristic of messages. In this specific research, the focus is on the 
qualitative side of content analysis since what is important is not the number of times a 
concept appears in the documents but rather the evolution of the position. 
 
 
3. Conclusions  
 
Since 1975, when formal diplomatic ties between the EU and China were officially 
established, bilateral relations have developed at considerable speed. For more than a 
decade, the EU has considered China as “strategic partner”.  Recently, however, in March 
2019 the EU issued a common report by changing significantly the EU narrative towards 
China, labelling China for the first time as “systemic rival”. This common position 
towards China does not seem to include the BRI: some member states have signed MoU 





Qualitative content analysis and literature review methods are used to test whether the 
EU has been able to take common actions towards the BRI. The hypothesis of the present 
paper will be rejected either if the EU has been able to reach an official position towards 













IV. ANALYSIS  
 
The present chapter investigates whether the EU has been able to take common actions 
towards the BRI. The hypothesis is that from the EU’s foreign policy perspective, the EU 
has been unable to find a common approach towards the BRI while it has been able to 
reach an agreement through its trade policy. In order to test the hypothesis, this chapter 
is divided in two sections. The first section, regarding the EU foreign policy, tests the first 
part of the hypothesis through content analysis from official documents from the EU. 
Then, section two, regarding the EU trade policy, reviews the literature through six papers 
that have been selected to verify the second part of the hypothesis.  
 
 
1. Belt Road Initiative from the EU’s foreign policy perspective  
 
At individual EU member states level, it is clear that the position regarding the BRI is 
diversified. So far, 14 EU economies have signed a MoU with China on the BRI, while 
other economies have expressed their concerns about the possible impacts that the 
initiative could generate. However, it is not clear whether at EU level there is a common 
approach towards to the BRI. Therefore, in this section, official documents issued by the 
EU are reviewed from September 2013 (when the BRI was launched) until October 2019. 
This implied the analysis of speeches from the HP, Conclusions from the Council of the 
EU and publications from the European Commission’s database. The analysis indicate 
that as expected there is a coherence between the documents issued by the three 
institutions. It also indicates that there has been an evolution in the EU way of looking at 
the BRI: from looking at it as an opportunity to mistrust.  
 
1.1. High Representative speeches  
 
Looking at the HP speeches to establish whether there is an official position of the EU 
regarding the BRI makes sense. As explained in chapter 2, the HP is expected to express 
EU position on matters related to CFSP. HP speeches are available at the EEAS’s website. 
Eight HP speeches were found by filtering as country China and only two of them 
mentions about the BRI. Therefore, these two speeches are selected to analysed further.  
 
One speech that talks about the BRI is the September 2018 “Speech by HR/VP Mogherini 
at the plenary session of the European Parliament on the state of the EU-China relations”. 
In this speech, Mogherini highlights how the EU and China are cooperating in a wide 
range of issues. She suggests that EU must not be “afraid to engage” with China’s BRI 
as it is a way of “creating synergies between their initiative and our projects on 




“sustainable development for local communities, and not about crafting new spheres of 
influence”. With this speech, Mogherini supports the BRI but also express her concerns 
on the sustainability of the BRI. 
 
In another more recent speech, of August 2019, titled “EU keen to strengthen security 
ties with Asia: foreign policy chief”. In this speech, there is an interesting direct question 
that was asked to Mogherini about what is the EU’s view regarding BRI. She answered 
the question very vaguely. She starts explaining that the EU is a great supporter of 
connectivity as she mentions “Connectivity is part of the EU's DNA”. Then, she remarks 
that EU also launched its own strategy on connecting Europe and Asia at the end of 2018 
(explained in chapter 1). Next, she highlights the necessity to “deepen our understanding 
of each other's connectivity policies (…) and ultimately to find ways in which our two 
approaches can be complimentary”. With this answer, the HR is suggesting that a possible 
cooperation with China’s BRI may take place but not at the present moment. 
 
This review of the HR speeches regarding BRI indicates it is possible to say that the 
current EU position regarding the BRI is ambiguous. While Mogherini suggests to engage 
with the BRI as it can create synergies with EU’s projects on connectivity, but at the same 
time she advises to be cautious with the initiative as she proposes to get the full 
understanding of the initiative before engaging with it.  
 
1.2. Council of the European Union Conclusions  
 
The Council of the EU can adopt no legally binding documents such as the Conclusions. 
The Conclusions express EU’s political position on a specific topic. In order to adopt a 
Conclusion, the consensus of all member states is needed. Therefore, by reviewing the 
Council of the EU Conclusions also allows to know which is the EU position regarding 
the BRI. At the Council’s official website, searching in the register list of Council 
Conclusions regarding China and the BRI, surprisingly among ten results that came out 
only one is about China’s BRI.  
 
The specific Conclusion that mentions BRI is titled as “EU Strategy on China - Council 
conclusions”. It was adopted at the meeting held on 18 July 2016, just a few days after 
the 18th EU-China Summit regarding the EU Strategy on China for the coming years. 
The point eleven of the document mentions the BRI. It expresses that the Council of the 
EU is in favour to cooperate with China’s BRI as it states that: “The Council supports 
cooperation with China” on its BRI. However, then the document remarks that under the 
condition that China is “fulfilling its declared aim of making it an open platform which 
adheres to market rules, EU and international requirements and standards, and 





Therefore, the analysis of the Council of the EU’s Conclusions also suggests that the 
current EU position regarding the BRI is ambiguous. In 2016, the EU was giving support 
to cooperate with the Chinese initiative but only under certain conditions.   
 
1.3. European Commission  
 
Looking at the European Commission publications regarding the BRI helps establish the 
view of the EU on this topic since this institution has the power to propose policy to the 
Council. By searching BRI in the European Commission website, it came out with around 
one hundred results, but only few of them are actually related to China’s BRI which are 
analysed below.  
 
The earliest document regarding the BRI found in the database of the European 
Commission is from 2014. Specifically, it is a “Joint Statement: Deepening the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit” from 31 March 2014. It states 
that both sides have decided to “develop synergies between EU policies and China's “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” initiative and jointly to explore common initiatives along these 
lines” as it considers a great potential to improve their transportation relations. With this, 
at that moment the EU started to considers to cooperate with China within the BRI 
framework, as it could bring synergies and the EU could be benefited from that.   
 
In 2015, the BRI was mentioned more times in the European Commission’s database. 
There is a speech by the President Junker named as “The EU and China: A solid 
partnership - Speech by President Juncker at the EU-China Business Summit Brussels”, 
from a summit that was held on 29 June 2015. He starts highlighting the importance of 
EU-China partnership and recognizes their cooperation can be even intensified more. 
Then Junker made clear that EU is interested on the BRI as he mentions “Let me say we 
take note with interest of China's 'One Belt One Road' initiative”. Furthermore, Junker 
sees the BRI as a project beneficial for both continents, as he mentions that the BRI “is 
the kind of strategic thinking from which both Asia, China and Europe could benefit.” 
 
Another document from 2015 is the “EU-China Summit joint statement”, from a summit 
that was held on 29 June 2015. It was the 17th EU-China Summit, which also coincides 
for the 40th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic relations. During the summit, both sides 
expressed their interest in each other’s initiatives, namely the Investment Plan for Europe 
and the BRI. In addition, in order to improve the connectivity links between the EU and 
China, they decided to stablish a new “Connectivity Platform”, which leads room for 
cooperation “between their respective policies (…) including the Trans-European 





In September 2015, the “Memorandum of Understanding between the National 
Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China and the 
European Commission on establishing a Connectivity Platform between China and the 
EU” signed on 23 September 2015. With this document, both sides agreed to establish 
the “Connectivity Platform” that had been decided at the 17th EU-China Summit to 
enhance synergies between China’s BRI and EU’s connectivity initiatives such as the 
Trans-European Networks. According to the document, the new platform “will create 
multiple business opportunities and promote employment, growth and development for 
both sides”. With the mentioned MoU signed, it shows officially how the EU is 
approaching the BRI. At least at that moment, the EU was greatly interested to cooperate 
with China’s BRI to develop infrastructure networks between the EU and China.  
 
However, in 2016 a speech from the Vice-President Katainen named "Prosperity and 
Economic Diplomacy" at a seminar on 26 February 2016, starts to express some concerns 
on the BRI. He suggests that the EU “can cooperate with China on this initiative to ensure 
our own companies and Member States benefit from this major project”. With this 
statement, he is in a warning to be cautious to cooperate with the BRI, as it is necessary 
to ensure that the EU can benefit from the Chinese initiative.  
 
A report published in June 2018 from the European Political Strategy Centre (European 
Commission’s in-house think tank), named “Geopolitical Outlook for Europe 
Confrontation vs Cooperation” gives policy advice to the EU. In the report, there is a 
section regarding China that reads “China’s divide-and-conquer strategy will continue to 
pose difficulties to homogenous EU approaches across several policy areas”. It indirectly 
suggests that EU member states are establishing relations with China within the 
framework of BRI individually rather than following what was set on the “EU Strategy 
on China” of 2016. 
 
The most recent European Commission publication about the BRI is the Vice-President 
Katainen’s speech at the EU-China Business Association lunch on 6 May 2019. He starts 
highlighting the size and the deep of EU-China relationship and then he follows to explain 
about what have been tacked at the 21st EU-China Summit earlier this year in April. He 
finishes his speech by talking about Euro-Asian connectivity and points out the EU 
Connectivity Strategy for Asia. Lastly, he mentions the BRI but in a way as warning to 
member states to stay united so as to achieve their objectives “We must stay united. This 
also applies to the Belt and Road Initiative”. By these words, it is noticeable that the EU 






Lastly, it is interesting also to detail a bit further about the most recent European 
Commission report issued on March 2019 regarding China “EU-China – A strategic 
outlook”. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU narrative on China has changed 
considerably with the publication of the mentioned report. The document starts 
highlighting the important trade links between the EU and China as two of world’s three 
largest economies. Moreover, the EU recognizes the China’s economic and political rise 
during the last decades. It recommends 10 concrete actions concerning for discussion and 
endorsement by the European Council. The paper mentions several aspects to consider, 
such as WTO reforms for China, market access and fair competition and protections for 
investors. Remarkably, while the report fully references other Chinese initiatives such as 
“Made in China 2025” and the EU’s infrastructure initiative on Connecting Europe and 
Asia “Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy”, it does not 
directly mention the BRI. Yet, the joint communication stresses the fact that “neither the 
EU nor any of its member states can effectively achieve their aims with China without 
full unity”. According to analysts (Wallace, 2019), the EU is warning its member 
countries to act as a union when dealing with China and that includes the BRI.  
 
From the European Commission perspective, in 2015 the aim was to cooperate with China 
by creating the “EU-China Connectivity Platform” and by so doing to strengthen the 
synergies between China's BRI and the EU's Trans-European Transport Network's policy. 
However, more recently, in 2018 the EU launched its own initiative to infrastructure 
initiative on Connecting Europe and Asia, the “EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and 
Asia”. In addition, in recent years the European Commission started to warm member 
states to act in unity in front of China’s initiative. Therefore, it seems that the EU have 
realized that there is a need for a stronger EU framework dealing with China, as members 
states are seeking to engage at the individual level with China.  
 
 
2. Belt Road Initiative from EU’s trade policy perspective  
 
The EU is considered to be one of the most open investment regimes in the world (OECD, 
2019). However, recently the EU has started to show protectionist behaviour against 
inflow FDI with the introduction of an EU-wide framework for FDI screening, the so 
called FDISR (Bungenberg and Hazarika, 2019). As explained in chapter 2, the Treaty of 
Lisbon brought several changes in the area of EU’s common commercial policy, among 
others, it placed FDI as an area of EU exclusive competence. The FDISR is explained 
further in detail in the first part of the present section. The second part reviews the 





Four journal articles have been selected for the review, one from each of following 
journals: Journal of World Investment & Trade, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 
China International Studies and Social Transformations in Contemporary Society. In 
addition, a policy paper from Centre for European Policy Studies and a joint report by 
Rhodium Group and the Mercator Institute for China Studies are also reviewed. While 
the selection has been done on grounds of the article content (it should cover the causes 
of the introduction of FDISR) rather than on the position of the article regarding the 
hypothesis (whether the causes are related with BRI), most articles consider that the 
FDISR is a response to Chinese investment in the EU.  
 
2.1. EU Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation 
 
The EU started to consider for a common framework for FDI screening regime when it 
was proposed by France, Germany and Italy in February 2017. Their respective 
governments submitted a joint letter to the European Commission expressing their 
concerns about non-EU investors are taking over EU companies with key technologies 
for strategic sectors, and proposed to introduce effective instruments to combat the 
situation at EU level (Grieger, 2019). In September of the same year, the European 
Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a framework for screening 
FDI inflows on grounds of EU security and public order (European Commission, 2019). 
After almost two years since the first draft was presented, the FDISR officially entered 
into force on 10 April 2019. There is a transitional period of 18 months for the European 
Commission and member states to take necessary steps to make sure that FDISR can fully 
apply as of 11 October 2020. Member states should use the transition period to make 
necessary changes to their national mechanisms and to implement administrative 
procedures to ensure effective cooperation at the EU level with the European 
Commission. 
 
At present, 14 member states have national screening mechanisms in place, namely 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. However, member states 
national screening mechanisms vary significantly both in scope and in design (European 
Commission, 2019). Therefore, with the introduction of the FDISR, it aims to stablish a 
comprehensive framework at the EU level for screening of FDI on the grounds for 
security or public order. In this way, as stated in the Article 3 of the FDISR, it does not 
require member states to have national FDI screening mechanism, member states may 
maintain their existing, adopt new ones or remain without such mechanism. However, the 
FDISR sets some key requirement for national screening mechanisms. They include 




confidentiality of information exchanged, the possibility of recourse against screening 
decisions and measures to identify and prevent circumvention by foreign investors.  
 
As stated in the Article 1, the FDISR establishes a framework for screening by member 
states of FDI into the EU on the grounds of security or public order. However, the FDISR 
does not define explicitly what constitutes security or public order, it leaves to member 
states to decide on this issue, but it does provide a non-exhaustive list of factors when a 
FDI is likely to affect security or public order. Article 4 (1) states that member states need 
to consider the potential effect of the FDI in areas including critical infrastructure, critical 
technologies, security supply of critical inputs or access to sensitive information or the 
ability to control sensitive information. In addition, under the Article 4 (2) the instrument 
also advises member states to take into consideration when the foreign investor is 
controlled by the government of a third country, including through significant funding.   
 
The FDISR creates an expedient of cooperation mechanism in relation to FDIs which 
either undergo screening or not. Under Article 6, when the FDI undergoes screening, the 
member state conducting it has the obligation to notify to the European Commission and 
the other member states about the screening that is conducting in its territory and the 
provide information regarding the FDI. It includes information about the investor and the 
target company, sectors in which they operate, value of the investment and its funding 
and the date of its completion. Once it is notified, both member states and the European 
Commission can provide their comments or opinion on whether such FDI is likely to 
affect security or public order. In the case that a FDI does not undergo screening (Article 
7), the European Commission or member states can request to the member state where 
the FDI is located to provide information about the FDI. When the European Commission 
considers that a determined FDI that is not undergoing screening is likely to affect 
security or public order, it also can provide an opinion. In any case, it should be noted 
that a member state is not under the obligation to follow the opinion of the European 
Commission, as member states retain their final decision-making power on FDI.  Finally, 
the European Commission can also offer an opinion to a FDI that is likely to affect 
projects or programmes of “Union interest”, such as Horizon 2020 or Trans-European 
Networks for Transport.  
 
2.2. Literature review  
 
In recent years, the rise of Chinese FDI in the EU in 2013 coincided with the launch of 
the BRI. Since 2013, Chinese FDI in the EU has increased at an exponential speed, from 
6.7 billion euros in 2013 to 37.2 billion euros in 2016 (Hanemann, Huotari and Kratz, 
2019). Following a decade of rapid growth, it started to decrease in 2017 after the Chinese 




real state or sports clubs (Blockmans and Hu, 2019). In addition, another reason for the 
fall of Chinese FDI in the EU is due to the fact that during 2017 and 2018 several EU 
economies, including Germany, France and the UK modernised their national investment 
screening regimes as a response to the Chinese investment (Hanemann et al., 2019). These 
updates have impacted Chinese investment patterns, as it blocked and delayed several 
Chinese acquisitions. As a result of mentioned reasons, Chinese FDI in the EU fell to 29.1 
billion euros in 2017, and further decreased to 17.3 billion euros in 2018 (Hanemann et 
al., 2019).     
 
According to Hanemann et al. (2019) the EU-wide FDISR could particularly impact 
Chinese investors. Le (2019) suggests that the FDISR is perceived as targeting China 
specifically because it makes provisions for dominant characteristics of the BRI 
investment strategy: the FDISR encourages member states to specifically review 
investments in sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure or state-backed investors. 
Following this criteria, Hanemann et al. (2019) suggests that 82 percent of Chinese 
transactions in the EU in 2018 would fall under at least one of previous criteria. More 
specific, 68 percent of investments in the EU were performed by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises in 2017 (Blockmans and Hu, 2019). This high percentage of Chinese state-
owned enterprises investing in the EU is due to the fact that they are less restricted in their 
ability to invest abroad, specially on projects backed by Beijing and labelled under the 
BRI (Le, 2019). In addition, another key feature of the EU’s new screening mechanism 
that suggests it is targeting specifically to the BRI, is the inclusion of the Trans-European 
Networks in the list of projects or program of “Union interest” (Bambalas, 2019) when 
the BRI is aiming at connecting China and Europe through both sea and land 
infrastructure.  
 
Blockmans and Hu (2019) also support the idea that the core motive for the introduction 
of the FDISR was to response to Chinese acquisitions in the EU under the BRI. Even 
though no specific list of projects has been drawn up under the BRI investments in the 
EU, it is noticeable that the current emphasis of Chinese FDI is on transport, infrastructure 
and energy projects which are clearly related to BRI. For example, one pillars of the BRI 
is the construction or improvement of land and sea transport infrastructure which is 
reasonable that much of Chinese investments in the EU involves upgrading existing 
infrastructure, such as the Port of Piraeus in Greece or Port of Zeebrugge in Belgium 
(both cases the investment come from the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company).  
According to Blockmans and Hu (2019) these investments in the EU port infrastructure 
combine both commercial and political purposes. Therefore, this fact has raised suspicion 






Bungenberg and Hazarika (2019) focuses their study more concretely regarding the 
Chinese FDI in the EU related to the energy sector. They suggest that a significant part 
of these investment in the energy sector was made under the BRI. During the last decade 
Chinese investment in the European energy sector are growing at significant rate. As of 
2015, around 28 billion USD have been invested in the EU energy sector. As energy 
infrastructure is considered as a critical sector for an economy, it rose concerns among 
EU economies over potential national security implications. In addition, Bungenberg and 
Hazarika (2019) notes that investing in EU energy sector does not only generate economic 
benefits but also a means to satisfy China’s interest in the EU, specifically to gain political 
influence. As a result, this is one of the reasons why the EU decided to introduce the 
FDISR. 
 
In front of the response of the EU towards Chinese investment in the region, Blockmans 
and Hu (2019) suggests that EU must not fall in the trap of protectionism. Moreover, Liu 
(2018) also considers that it would be more difficult for China and EU to reach 
cooperation agreements under the BRI due to the growing protectionism atmosphere in 
the EU with the introduction of the FDISR, which aims to protect strategic industries and 
projects or program of “Union interest”. Liu (2018) also suggests in front of the present 
situation, the EU and China may be forced to speed up their negotiations on the BIT. Such 
treaty would standardize the bilateral cooperation under a legal framework recognized by 
both sides and that would facilitate BRI related investment.  
 
However, Schill (2019) argues that the FDISR should not be exclusively considered to be 
aimed at protecting and defending EU and member states interests, rather the new 
regulation can provide to the EU other tangible external economic justification. As by 
having the possibility to limit FDI in the EU, it can be used by the EU as a bargaining 
tool in its trade and investment negotiations with third countries, such the case of the US 
or China. It would allow the EU to achieve better access of EU investors in their markets. 
Therefore, it wrong to merely consider that the EU is looking inward by establishing 
protectionist measures. FDISR can be seen as a tool to achieve further investment 






In general, the EU official documents do not mention the BRI. However, from the 
documents analysed it is possible to see how EU’s attitude has evolved over time, it can 
be divided into three stages. At first, during 2013 and 2014, the EU’s position was wait-




the EU reacted for the first time its opinion towards the BRI, which leads towards the first 
steps of a prudent cooperation. The EU expressed its idea to cooperate with China by 
creating the “EU-China Connectivity Platform”. However, in 2016 the EU started to 
express its concerns regarding the BRI and since 2018, the EU’s attitude focused on 
urging individual member states to act together and launching its own EU-Asia 
Connectivity strategy.  
 
Regarding EU’s trade policy response, one may detect an evolution towards a more 
protectionist posture through the establishment of the FDISR. This EU framework for 
determining when investments threaten EU interest may not seem sufficient, as the 
ultimate decision is still left for member state where the FDI is target. However, it 
provides a mechanism for information sharing with the European Commission and 
member states, as other member states and the European Commission may offer their 
comments or opinion to the member state that is conducting the screening. A literature 
review on the causes of FDISR indicates that the introduction of the FDISR was an 
answer to the Chinese investments related to the BRI. While FDISR does not provide an 
exhaustive list regarding which type investments poses a threat to the security or public 
order, all BRI investment targets (such as infrastructure, energy, technology or state-











During the last few decades China has become one of the world’s most important 
economies. In a context of rising protectionism, China has the opportunity to occupy the 
spaces left by other powers and to develop into the biggest driving force of globalization 
with the launch of the BRI in 2013. The BRI provides an opportunity for China to play a 
leading role at the global landscape as the initiative has certainly attracted attention. To 
date more than one hundred countries have endorsed to the BRI, despite criticism received 
from the US. However, the EU does not seem to have a clear position towards the 
initiative proposed by China. So far there are 14 individual EU member states have signed 
a BRI MoU with China. In contrast, some other countries in the EU are not so supportive 
regarding the BRI, such as Germany. The present paper has investigated whether the EU 
has been able to take common actions regarding the BRI. Since the EU’s foreign policy 
is not as developed as its trade policy, the hypothesis was that while the EU has been 
unable to find a common approach towards the BRI through its foreign policy, it has been 
able to do so through its trade policy. 
 
A content analysis of the EU official publications indicates that the EU has been unable 
to find common ground from a foreign policy perspective, giving support to the first half 
of the research hypothesis. The results show that in general the EU official publications 
do not mention BRI. This fact can be interpreted that as the EU’s foreign policy nature is 
intergovernmental, this means that the decision making process is based on unanimity 
which limits the capacity to speak with a single voice. Despite the fact that the EU’s 
foreign policy remains weak and underdeveloped, however, the qualitative content 
analysis review of the official publications issued by the European Council, and the 
European Commission indicates that there is a coherence between the documents. 
Moreover, the European Commission publications show an evolution regarding the BRI: 
from looking at it as an opportunity to looking at it with mistrust.  
 
The review of the literature on the reasons behind the FDISR also supports the research 
hypothesis. Most articles consider that the FDISR is a response to Chinese investment in 
the EU. Although the FDISR has no power to impose on individual member states 
decisions as the ultimate decision is still left for member state where the FDI is target, it 
allows to establish transparency, as it is a mechanism for information sharing with the 
European Commission and the other member states. At the same time, it provides a 
common answer to the BRI. This is possible as a result of the existence of common 






Therefore, the results indicate that the hypothesis of the present paper cannot be rejected 
as nowadays the EU’s foreign policy towards the BRI is lukewarm and from the EU trade 
perspective the introduction of the FDISR is considered to be related with the BRI. It 
brings to the conclusion that while half of the EU member states have already signed 
bilateral cooperation agreements with China on the BRI, the EU itself is evolving towards 
a more protectionist approach in order to deal with growing Chinese influence. In 
addition, it is worthy to highlight that the EU is resisting the China’s attempt to divide it, 
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